Abstract-Modern consumer devices, like smartphones and tablets, have multiple interfaces (e.g., WiFi and 3G) that attach to new access points as users move. These mobile, multi-homed computers are a poor match with an Internet architecture that binds connections to fixed end-points with topology-dependent addresses. As a result, hosts typically cannot spread a connection over multiple interfaces or paths, or change locations without breaking existing connections.
I. INTRODUCTION
The end-to-end argument is a classic design principle of the Internet. This simple yet powerful idea-that end-hosts should manage their own communication without the involvement of intermediaries-was a major factor in the huge success of the Internet. However, TCP/IP was designed in an era when each host connected to a single, fixed attachment point. In contrast, today's Internet-connected devices have multiple interfaces (e.g., WiFi and 3G) and can move frequently. To leverage the full capabilities of modern devices, the end-host protocols should change to support path multiplicity (where a single connection is spread over multiple interfaces or paths) and location dynamism (where hosts can change locations without breaking ongoing connections).
Existing solutions address location dynamism by redirecting traffic when hosts move. This requires adding middleboxes (like home agents in Mobile IP), and leads to inefficient "triangle routing." Other solutions, like placing multiple wireless access points in the same virtual LAN (VLAN), support only limited mobility within a single subnet. Previous research proposals have proposed flat addressing, to allow hosts to retain their addresses as they move, at the expense of new scalability and deployment challenges. Other work that used end-to-end connection protocols was either underspecified [6] , thus missing important subtleties, or exhibited incorrect behavior [17] .
In this paper, we design a provably correct end-to-end connection control protocol (ECCP) that supports migration, multiple interfaces, and mobility. The solution works on top of the IP protocol and location-dependent addresses, enabling incremental deployment on today's Internet. Our design rests on an extensive study of existing protocols and proposals, and a practical experience in end-host stack design [5] . ECCP supports location dynamism by allowing a device to inform all of its correspondent hosts of the new address. Path multiplicity is supported by allowing a single connection to consist of one or more flows, each associated with an interface or path. Flows can change to different interfaces or IP addresses over time, without breaking their connection.
The TCP/IP network stack couples connection control (e.g., starting and stopping connections and flows, and changing the addresses associated with flows) with data delivery functionality (e.g., congestion control, reliable delivery, and flow control) in a single transport layer. In this work, we focus only on connection control, and argue that this functionality should be logically separate from data delivery. ECCP can be engineered into an existing transport protocol like TCP, or into a new sub-transport layer that provides connection control for multiple data delivery protocols. We give an example of the latter approach, and share practical lessons on how ECCP can be integrated in a new network stack [5] .
A challenge in realizing an end-to-end protocol like ECCP is that such protocols are notoriously hard to get right, because of message re-ordering and subtle corner cases. Mobility and address multiplicity further exacerbate the problem. To ensure the correctness of ECCP in face of these challenges, we modeled the protocol in SPIN [9] , formally verifying that it is free from livelocks and deadlocks-even in face of mobility, packet loss, and reordering. To our knowledge, this is the first mobility protocol to be formally verified and the development of the model is one of our contributions. A unique trait of our model is the inclusion of network packet loss, duplication, and reordering. Most previous works on network verification either did not model message loss [15] or did not model packet reordering [10, 11, 16] . Fersman and Jonsson [3] did model lossy, reordered channels but did not give any details or analysis of their method of doing so. They also limited their analysis to safety properties that did not test for livelocks, thus avoiding issues of fair retransmission of packets (as discussed in Section V).
In the process of building the model, we found bugs with both our original design and with an earlier mobility protocol [17] . We used our verified model to construct a detailed state-transition diagram for the protocol, which was used as a guide when building our implementation of ECCP. Our model guarantees that connectivity is preserved in the face of location dynamism as long as communicating hosts do not move at exactly the same time. If hosts do move simultaneously, connectivity can still be preserved if the network has a special "redirection middlebox" that temporarily facilitates the re-establishment of the connection based on the previous addresses.
This paper makes the following contributions: 1) Defines correctness requirements for protocols that handle location dynamism and path multiplicity. 2) Shows an in-band signaling protocol that meets these correctness requirements and does not require changing the topological nature of Internet addressing or adding in-network middleboxes. 3) Formally verifies the correctness of the proposed protocol. 4) Identifies some key points in the design space of protocols of this type. 5) Implements this protocol as part of a new network architecture [5] to serve as a proof-of-concept. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we discuss the requirements that must be fulfilled by a connection control protocol and analyze the related works to give the reader a sense of where ECCP fits into the broader network architecture landscape. Next, we will present the details of the protocol in Section III and offer a discussion of the design decisions that went into it. Section IV discusses how this protocol can be used to benefit emerging technologies. In Section V, we discuss how we formally verified that the protocol fulfills its correctness requirements. Then, we address the security of the protocol in Section VI and present a solution to the problem of simultaneous movement in Section VII. Finally, we conclude with some final thoughts.
II. PROTOCOL REQUIREMENTS AND RELATED WORK
In this section we define requirements to be met by an endto-end connection control protocol to correctly handle both location dynamism and path multiplicity. We also discuss past works and how they meet these requirements.
A. Protocol Requirements
In the traditional network stack, the transport layer is responsible for initiating a connection to another end-point, and then taking an application stream and dividing it into packets to send over the connection. The network layer delivers these packets according to best effort, and the transport layer on the other end-point reassembles the packets into an application stream again. With this division of labor, the transport layer conflates two separate functionalities:
• Data Delivery-takes an application stream and divides it into packets and flows. It guarantees the delivery semantics required by the application (e.g., ordering, reliability) and handles congestion control.
• Connection Control-associates flows with the correct network addresses and demuxes incoming packets to flows. In this work, we treat connection control and data delivery as logically separate, focusing on the requirements of connection control.
Traditionally, protocols used by connection control operate at the beginning and the end of a connection, i.e., when establishing and tearing down a flow. However, to support mobility and changing addresses, connection control should fulfill the following requirement: two communicating hosts are guarantee continued connectivity whenever the network addresses of either (but not both) host changes or some (but not all) of its interfaces go down. To support this requirement, we develop a connection control protocol that allows hosts to signal address changes for ongoing flows. This protocol must operate correctly even when control packets are lost, reordered, duplicated, or arbitrarily delayed, and must ensure connectivity in both directions. Further, it should restore connectivity even when changes happen in quick succession. To handle such cases, the more recent change has to be able to override a previous one that is no longer valid. For example, when moving to a new location before completing a (re)connection handshake at a previous location.
The ECCP protocol meets the above requirement by allowing connection control to (re)negotiate the network addresses using an in-band signaling protocol. The connection control demultiplexes packets to flows, allowing data delivery to make use of path multiplicity without dealing with low-level network identifiers. Because ECCP is separate from data delivery, it should not concern itself with any reliability guarantees.
The requirements for connection control explicitly excludes simultaneous movement which we formally define as the case when both hosts move before either one could receive a single packet 1 from its peer informing it of the peer's new address. Therefore, this requirement applies only when at least one of the hosts is able to successfully inform its correspondent host of the new address it has acquired. We exclude the case of simultaneous movement because no in-band signaling protocol can correctly handle this case; rather, additional techniques must be used, as discussed in Section VII.
B. Related Work
The problems of location dynamism and path multiplicity have been studied extensively. We will first look at alternative approaches to using in-band signaling. Then, we will look at other work that has used in-band signaling to address these issues.
1) Alternative Approaches: Probably the most widely used solution to location dynamism is Mobile IP [13, 14] . This approach uses triangle routing where each device has a "homeagent" with which it registers its current address as it moves. When a peer wants to reach a particular device, it sends packets to the device's home-agent, which then forwards the packet to the appropriate location. The approach has two main drawbacks: (i) it is not as efficient as in-band signaling since connections need to be established through the home agent and (ii) it requires a home agent to be aware of a host's location as it moves, which is a major privacy concern for devices such as cellphones whose location history mirrors that of the owner.
Other approaches that implement the so-called location/identity split [8, 12, 18, 19] have sought to change the Internet architecture to allow addresses to move with devices. The network became responsible for routing on addresses that were no longer tied to physical locations. These proposals require significant changes to the network (impacting deployment) and may not scale well.
2) In-band Signaling Protocols: A comparison of selected previous works that have addressed either path multiplicity or location dynamism through in-band signaling is presented in Table I . TCP-R [6] was the first to propose in-band signaling for handling location dynamism but did not offer any details about protocol operation such as sequencing or retransmission. TCP Migrate [17] specified a full protocol for in-band signaling to handle migration. However, we have found that TCP Migrate cannot guarantee reconnections due to corner cases where packet delay and loss lead to lost connectivity. This misbehavior is a result of relying on implicit connection control acknowledgments through the data stream, as described in Section III-C. TCP Migrate also gives greater security guarantees than the current network stack (and ECCP) by adding protection against on-path hijacking attacks. This added security, however, comes at the cost of requiring heavyweight cryptology.
Multipath TCP (MPTCP) [4] defines a method of using multiple network paths for one connection at the transport layer. We envision that ECCP will be used in conjunction with a transport-layer protocol like Multipath TCP. Location dynamism is handled in MPTCP by starting new flows on new addresses instead of by changing the addresses associated with existing flows. In contrast, our approach allows handling mobility by either starting new flows or moving existing ones. This added flexibility may be useful to some data delivery protocols.
III. THE ECCP PROTOCOL
The design of ECCP consists of three main parts. First, endpoints perform a handshake to establish a connection with a single flow. Second, the end-points can add more flows to the existing connection to use additional interfaces or paths. Third, the end-points can change the addresses associated with ongoing flows as attachment points change or interfaces fail. All of these parts are captured in ECCP's state machine, as shown in Figure 1 . In the rest of the section we will detail the protocol that moves connections between these states. Later, in Section V, we will describe how we used formal modeling to verify the correctness of the state machine.
A. Establishing a New Connection With a Single Flow
ECCP establishes connections and their constituent flows, and creates the state necessary to map between flows and the underlying interfaces used for transmission. Each flow is assigned its own identifier, called a flowID, which is essentially an opaque demultiplexing key that maps packets to socket state. The usage of flowIDs avoids overloading other identifiers in the traditional demultiplexing "five tuple", thus solving the problem of binding the flow to a specific combination of IP addresses and ports, which inhibits mobility.
Connections start with a three-way handshake, as shown in Figure 2 ; these messages initialize the state of the connection and a single initial flow, as shown in Table II . After establishing a connection, ECCP places the appropriate IP address and flowID in outgoing packets and demultiplexes incoming packets to the right flow based on the flowID. A list of peer interfaces (ILists) that could be used for establishing new flows are also exchanged during connection establishment. ILists increase connection resilience by allowing for the establishment of flows on alternative interfaces if the active interfaces go down. The connection-establishment protocol ensures several key properties:
Confirming reverse connectivity. Network paths can exhibit asymmetric connectivity, where host A can reach B but B cannot reach A. To ensure bidirectional communication, ECCP uses a three-way handshake where the client sends an ACK to the server to confirm connectivity on the reverse path, similar to today's TCP. A similar three-way handshake is necessary to reestablish connectivity when a flow changes interfaces or addresses, as discussed in Section III-C. Separate demultiplexing keys on each host. ECCP uses explicit flowIDs that uniquely identify the flow. Each flow has two flowIDs, one for each host, rather than a single shared identifier. Each host demultiplexes incoming packets using only its local flowID, but includes the remote flowID in outgoing packets so the receiving host can demultiplex on its own identifier. Using two independent flowIDs offers two main benefits. First, allowing hosts to pick their own identifier makes it easier to ensure uniqueness at each end-point. Second, having separate identifiers simplifies reasoning about the protocol and proving properties about flow demultiplexing.
B. Adding Flows to an Existing Connection
Either end-point can add flows to an existing connection, to spread traffic over multiple interfaces or paths. Figure 3 shows how a client adds a flow between local address A2 and server address A4; the steps for the server to add a flow are analogous.
Supporting flexible policies for selecting interfaces. To establish a new flow, the two end-points must agree on which pair of interfaces to use. Each host may have its own policies for selecting interfaces, based on performance, reliability, and cost. For example, a smartphone user may prefer to use a lowcost and high-performing WiFi interface for high-bandwidth applications, instead of a more reliable (but more expensive) 3G interface. (If the WiFi connectivity is no longer available, the end-point could migrate the flow to the 3G interface to continue the connection.) To support flexible local policies, ECCP allows each end-point to select its own interface. The initiating host selects a local interface (and associated IP address) for the new flow, and sends a SYN packet to one of the interfaces at the remote end-point. Upon receiving the SYN, the remote end-point selects a (possibly different) interface based on its own local policies, and responds with a SYN-ACK. So, while the initiating end-point may influence the decision (e.g., by picking a remote interface based on past performance), the remote end-point has the final say on which of its local interfaces to use.
C. Changing the IP Addresses of Existing Flows
When a host changes location due to device mobility, VM migration, or failover, it needs to preserve flow connectivity by notifying its peers of its new network addresses. We present the protocol used to update the peers in Figure 4 , where the mobile host changes its address and notifies the stationary host. Once a mobile host establishes a new address for one of its interfaces, it runs this protocol on every flow using that interface.
This protocol can also be used to update the IList even if the address on active flows does not change (e.g., an alternative interface established connectivity). In that case, the new address on the flow simply remains the same as the old one; only the IList changes. The IList is always updated as a single entity with the new list overriding the old one. No incremental update protocol is provided to avoid convergence issues. Because the IList is not very large, the amount of communication overhead saved with an incremental update protocol is not worth the added protocol complexity.
Migrating flows independently. When a host moves, many of its addresses may change at once. Therefore, it may seem more efficient to have migration requests refer to connections or to interfaces instead of having each host migrate each flow independently. However, this complicates the protocol by introducing dependencies between flows, which would make the protocol harder to verify. It would also complicate demultiplexing rules by allowing control messages to affect flows with different flowIDs. In addition, disparate flows can have different timeout timers and different timers related to migration events (e.g., how long after a migration to initiate a migration handshake). For this reason, all migration messages concern a single flow.
Use of version numbers. Upon receiving a RSYN packet, a hosts needs to verify that the change of address requested is not stale. To this end, the ECCP migration protocol uses version numbers so that a host getting a new migration request can determine whether the request is newer than the last one that was processed. For example, if a client moves from Address A1 to A2 to A3, the server may receive the migration request for A3 before A2, and must then know to ignore the old migration request to guarantee correctness. We create a new version number space and do not reuse the sequence space of the transport layer to make ECCP independent of any given transport level protocol. Furthermore, a version number is global to the connection and not to an individual flow to give an ordering to IList updates. This ordering is needed to determine the most current IList even if it is updated by multiple flows on a connection. The initial version number is established during the initial SYN handshake, much like the initial sequence number in TCP. Version numbers must increase monotonically across RSYN events. We handle version number wraparound in the same way as TCP handles sequence number wraparound.
It is noteworthy that our use of version numbers is markedly different than sequence numbers in TCP. Namely, we do not use version numbers for reliability. That is, upon receiving a packet with version number N, we do not verify that we have previously received all packets with version numbers less than N, but rather only verify that N is greater than any version number previously received. This is in stark contrast to sequence numbers, which require the processing of all packets up to sequence number N-1 before the packet with sequence number N can be processed. We use version and not sequence numbers because at any given time, a host's peer only cares about the current address on a flow and not the history of address changes that occurred on an interface. In addition, migration message processing should not be delayed waiting for stale migration messages, which cannot be processed because the interface addresses have again changed. Migration messages should reflect the current state of its interfaces; the history of migrations does not matter.
Originally, we considered an alternative design that avoided version numbers. Since each change of a version number is accompanied by a three-way handshake, we considered instead requiring flowIDs to change after each successful migration. This change in flowID establishes an ordering on migration control packets, as only packets containing the most current flowID would be accepted as valid. While this method appears to work (and we formally verified portions of this protocol), it adds complexity to the protocol and introduces non-obvious edge-cases into the demultiplexing rules. And in the end, it only saved a few bytes of space in control packets. Thus, we instead introduced version numbers for a cleaner protocol design. Explicit acknowledgments. The ECCP protocol does not use the same method of implicit acknowledgment of migration messages as TCP Migrate because we found that method to have misbehaving corner-cases. TCP Migrate used the fact that it received data packets on the new address as a de-facto acknowledgment that a migration message was received. We illustrate one misbehaving corner case in Figure 5 where the migration at time T2 is lost but thought to be acknowledged. To avoid such corner case, we introduce explicit ACK packets that carry the version number of the migration but can still be piggy-backed on data packets.
IV. CASE STUDIES: CURRENT AND FUTURE
APPLICATIONS In this section we will discuss how ECCP can be used to fulfill the full potential of new and emerging technologies. For each technology, we will give a brief overview of its functionality and how it is limited by the current network stack and then explain how ECCP can help. For some application we use our implementation of the ECCP protocol to serve as a proof-of-concept of its utility. The implementation is part of a broader network architecture project [5] , which includes additional changes to the network. But, the applications we present here only use the ECCP protocol for their operation.
A. Mobile Devices
Handling physical device movement is a challenge for the current network stack. Currently device mobility is handled in one of three ways: 1) Devices can change IP addresses, break any existing ongoing connections, and rely on application-level recovery. 2) Internet providers can use MobileIP [13] with all of the limitations, as described in Section II. 3) Providers can use various hacks such as large layer-2
VLANs to preserve device addresses when the locations of devices change. This approach gives up scalable address aggregation, making it feasible only within a single enterprise or campus. In contrast, ECCP supports location dynamism by allowing devices to simply change their addresses as they move.
B. Devices with Multiple Network Interfaces
Many Internet enabled devices now have multiple network interfaces. Servers have multiple network cards, each with its own IP addresses and both smartphones and tablets often have both WiFi and 3G connections. These devices, however, cannot fully leverage this multiplicity of network attachments as each connection is statically tied to a single network address. Path multiplicity allows such devices to use all their interfaces for the same connection. For example, figure 6 shows how our implementation can use path multiplicity to get better throughput on a connection. At the same time location dynamism allows flows to failover to alternative interfaces if an interface goes down.
C. Virtual Machine Migration and Failover
Modern servers often run on virtual machines (VMs) to ease management tasks and create a more flexible infrastructure. Recently, two new technologies have emerged: Live VM Migration and Virtual Machine Failover Replication. During live VM migration, a VM on one physical host gets transferred to another physical host in a way that is seamless for any host communicating with it. In Virtual Machine Failover Replication [2] , a primary VM syncs its state with a backup VM, which can then act as a hot-spare and take over upon failure of the primary VM. Fig. 7 . This experiment shows VM migration across layer-2 domains using ECCP. The throughput shown is that of a client that communicates with a VM that migrates at 10s. The gap between 10s and 20s is while the VM has moved to the new location but not yet received a new address (via the hypervisor cycling its interfaces, causing a new DHCP request), as well as the delay for TCP to pickup after retransmission timeouts. This graph shows that communication can be restored even after a potentially long period of disconnection (although optimizations for faster address reassignment can be used to reduce this delay significantly).
To make these operations appear seamless to hosts communicating with the VM, ongoing connections need to migrate between physical hosts. Currently, this requirement limits these operations in that the two machines running the VMs have to reside on the same layer-2 domain so that the layer-3 address used by the VM can remain static. ECCP would allow layer-3 addresses to change without breaking ongoing connections and thus allow wide-area VM migration and failover replication. Figure 7 shows the throughput between a client and a migrating server using our implementation.
D. Multi-homing
Many networks are now serviced by multiple ISPs. This is especially prevalent in datacenters where a single datacenters can have peering connections with many providers. Currently, a host has no way to choose the path that its connections use. A possible solution is to allow ISPs to assign multiple virtual addresses to a single host interface to allow the host some control over the possible paths. In this scenario, path multiplicity would allow hosts to stripe data across different providers for the same connection.
E. Multipath Networking
The networking community is actively working on ways to support multipath routing. However, there has been little research in how to handle demultiplexing on the end-hosts and allow paths to change in response to mobility. ECCP's flow abstraction maps nicely to that of paths by substituting paths (or pathlets [7] ) wherever we currently refer to addresses. Path multiplicity would allow multiple paths to be used at once and location dynamism would allow modifying paths without breaking flows.
V. FORMAL VERIFICATION
Distributed protocols such as ECCP are difficult to reason about, precisely because they involve multiple independent hosts that communicate asynchronously over unreliable channels. Hosts execute in arbitrary order, and messages can be lost, reordered, or duplicated. These factors lead to a large number of possible execution traces of the protocol, each of which needs to be analyzed for correctness. Analyzing such protocols only informally-e.g., by considering the most common execution traces-can lead to a belief in protocol correctness that is later found out to be false, due to misbehaving edge-cases. Formal analysis, on the other hand, is hampered by the difficulty in analyzing a very large number of execution traces in a timely manner.
This section discusses our experience analyzing ECCP using SPIN [9] , a formal verification tool that uses a variety of techniques to cut down on the complexity of the state-space of execution traces. Even still, we had to develop several novel approaches for using SPIN in order to deal with network packet loss and reordering, as well as to guarantee that packet retransmission timeouts were executed in a way that did not interfere with protocol liveness verification. Our model verifies that the ECCP protocol is free from livelocks and deadlocks, as well as fulfills its correctness requirement. To our knowledge, this is the first end-to-end migration protocol to be formally verified.
In this section, we first discuss the safety and liveness properties that we use to guarantee ECCP's correctness, and provide an overview of SPIN and its verification mechanisms. Next, we describe our model for ECCP and the challenges inherent to modeling such networking protocols. Then, we discuss the completeness and limitations of our verification, as well as its results. The full SPIN model is presented in a technical report [1] .
A. A Formal Definition of Correctness
Traditionally, a protocol needs to be verified for two properties to prove correctness: safety and liveness. The safety property requires that no execution of the protocol can deadlock. Deadlocks violate the correctness of ECCP since connectivity cannot be restored if either host is deadlocked.
The liveness property verifies that the protocol cannot enter an infinite loop where each execution of the loop makes no progress towards achieving the goal of the protocol. In ECCP, the goal of the protocol is to allow hosts to communicate with each other, as specified earlier in Section II. Thus, we define the liveness property as the ability to send a message (such as a ping) to the correspondent host on any flow and get a response back. Verifying the liveness property guarantees that data can eventually be transferred between the two hosts on any execution of the protocol. The combination of the safety and liveness properties guarantees that our requirement is satisfied not just for every connection, but for every flow as well.
B. Verification in SPIN
We now give a very brief overview of SPIN before describing how we use it to model ECCP. SPIN is a C-like language which allows you to define multiple processes and the communication between them (notably, using reliable FIFO channels). An execution trace is a single possible execution of the SPIN program with a particular process execution and message delivery order. SPIN analyzes all possible execution traces to explore all possible protocol executions.
Protocol verification often faces a "state-space explosion" problem. The execution state includes the values of all global variables, local process variables, and communication queues, defined at a single point in time during an execution trace. The state-space of the verification refers to the set of all execution states found in all possible execution traces. In order for verification to complete, the state-space must be kept relatively small. Yet, exploring all possible execution traces of a protocol can easily create exponential blow-up in the statespace! One of the biggest challenges in creating a model is in using the right amount of simplification to avoid such statespace explosion, while at the same time making sure that the model remains sound-i.e., that these simplifications do not remove misbehaviors that exist in the real protocol from the model. SPIN can perform various checks on the states in the statespace that it verifies. ECCP uses the following type of checks to verify the protocol:
• Asserts are those familiar C checks that verify some conditional expression. These checks are used to sanitycheck protocol execution.
• Progress labels are code labels used to mark pieces of code that must be executed at least once in any cycle in a execution trace. A cycle in an execution trace implies a possible loop in the execution of the protocol, and thus needs to be checked for liveness. Progress labels are a method of specifying liveness properties by requiring some parts of code to be reached on every iteration of a protocol loop. There are two progress labels in this model. One is located when a host receives a response message back from its correspondent host. This verifies the liveness property described above. The second progress label marks the code that models packet loss, as described in the next section.
• Safety checks are used to verify that the code never deadlocks. They are implemented by simply verifying that each state in the state-space has a possible transition to another state. This verification checks that any state visited by SPIN either transitions to another state or that the state marks the end of one possible run of the verification. This verifies that no deadlock exists, since a protocol that is deadlocked would be in a state that would not be able to transition to any other states.
C. Modeling ECCP in SPIN
The SPIN verification models two hosts communicating with each other using a single flow. We first describe how the model represents hosts, communication, and addresses. Next, we discuss how we represent flowIDs, which present special challenges due to their randomness. Finally, we describe why modeling only two hosts and communicating over a single flow is sufficient to prove the correctness of a protocol that operates in an environment with many hosts and supports the use multiple flows.
At a high level, the model represents each host as a different process. Network communication is modeled using a global array of FIFO queues. The index of the queue element corresponds to an address. Each host process reads from the element in the array corresponding to the address of its interface and writes to the queue element corresponding to the address it wants to send a packet to. Modeling migration is done by changing the array element a host process uses to receive data. The mobile host then sends ECCP protocol messages to the stationary host informing it of the new "address" (i.e., array element) it acquired. The stationary hosts then changes the array element it uses to communicate with the mobile host. We also needed to model ECCP's randomized flowIDs. But, SPIN, like most formal method verification methods, cannot deal with randomness well. In order to verify a protocol with randomness, the verifier has to evaluate all possible values for the random variables, which leads to intractable state-space explosion. Thankfully, even though the ECCP protocol uses randomness, we can avoid introducing randomness into the model, while still checking for the same semantic properties in ECCP. After all, flowID randomness is used for two purposes: (i) to prevent flowID guessing by off-path entities and (ii) to ensure that different hosts use different flowIDs. The former property is a security rather than safety property, and we do not verify security in our formal model. The latter property, on the other hand, is needed to be modeled in order to ensure that packets meant for other hosts are dropped (as discussed previously in Section V-C). But we can avoid randomness (which prevents flowID collision with high probability) while preserving unique flowsIDs by just centrally assigning different flowsIDs to different hosts. This change allow us to remove the use of randomness in our model, and therefore avoid the corresponding state space explosion. Note, that we do not model the highly unlikely case that a flowID collision occurs. This case can only affect protocol correctness if it causes a packet meant for one host to be processed by another. For that to occur, multiple unlikely events need to happen: a host moves to a new address that was recently occupied by another host, gets a delayed packet meant for the old host, and that packet has the same flowID as one of its flows (this event by itself has a probability on the order of 2 −32 ).
It is sound to model only two hosts because the protocol insures that hosts cannot interfere with each other. The only possible way that two hosts could interfere would be if a packet meant for one host, gets processed by another. But, two different host would, with high probability, have different flowIDs for their flows. Since any packet which is received with a flowID that does not correspond to an active flow is dropped, packets meant for other hosts would never be processed.
Similarly, it is sound to model only two flows because we can show packets that are meant for one flow are not pro-cessed by another and that shared flow state can be reasoned about without a formal model. Incoming packets always get processed by the correct flow because all demultiplexing is based on flowIDs which are guaranteed to be unique for each flow on a given host. The only shared state that flows (of the same connection) have are peer interface lists and version numbers, both of which are easy to reason about without formal models. The only property that is necessary to verify about the correctness of interface lists is that a host can always update its state with the single most recent list it got from its peer. This property directly follows from our use of version numbers. Since we don't need to model versioning of interface lists and the only property of version numbers used by the protocol is that they are monotonically increasing, we can also ignore the fact that version numbers are shared across the flows of a connection. From the point of view of an individual flow, other flows could only cause version numbers to "skip ahead", which would not effect their monotonicity.
D. Challenges in Modeling an Unreliable Network
ECCP should operate correctly over a network with only best-effort delivery guarantees. Therefore, our verification has to simulate packet loss, reordering, and duplication. Modeling these network effects can create state-space explosion. We now describe how we model these effects in SPIN while keeping the increase in state-space manageable. Next, we describe challenges encountered when modeling ECCP's packet retransmission as a response to packet loss.
1) Loss and Reordering of Network Packets:
The model of ECCP has to simulate loss and the reordering of packets in the network. Natively, SPIN does not model loss and reordering since most application-layer protocols sit on top of an existing transport layer that guarantees reliability. ECCP, however, is below the transport layer and its messages are not sent reliably. Previous work [3] had identified two major ways of modeling these network effects: (i) a separate process non-deterministically take packets out of the communication queues and drop or reorder them and (ii) non-deterministic loss or reordering when sending or receiving packets.
After testing both approaches, we conclude that the second approach is much more efficient. Having a separate process reorder packets leads to more state-space explosion because the verifier checks all possible interleaving of the process that simulates packet loss and reorder with the host processes. However, it does not matter to the protocol when the packet it received was reordered (e.g., five or ten steps earlier), just whether a reordering or loss event occurred. By limiting loss and reordering events to send and receive operations, we vastly reduces the state-space without affecting the soundness of the protocol verification. The implementation of the operations that simulate the network effects has to avoid creating unnecessary branches in the state-space. For example, even though reordering necessitates the creation of new states corresponding to the new order of messages in the queue, the changes to the global state-space should be minimized to this minimal change. But, reordering requires the use of temporary variables to store intermediate values. These temporary variables are part of the state space and changing their values creates unnecessary branches in the state space. This is resolved by resetting all temporary variables to a constant after their use, which merges the state-space branch back to a common value.
We model network effects inside the send operation. The implementation of the network effects inside the send operation is hidden from the host, which simply invokes the send operation to send packets. This solution encountered some challenges dealing with the semantics of SPIN. We refer the reader to the technical report [1] for further details.
2) Timeouts: Any network protocol that operates over a lossy network needs to have a notion of timeouts to retransmit packets that may have been lost. SPIN, however, has no notion of time, and so does not directly model timeouts based on clock time. SPIN does, however, have a predefined boolean called "timeout" that is activated whenever no process can perform any operation. In effect, the timeout flag creates a secondary set of operations in each process that are activated whenever the primary set of operations is blocked for all processes in the system. In our model, we used this secondary set of operations to perform retransmission. Intuitively, whenever the regular operation of the protocol cannot make progress, retransmission kicks in to try to remedy the situation.
The above technique works well if the timeouts that retransmit packets are fair. Fairness is a property that states that if we have two or more processes, each individual process will eventually get a chance to perform its operations in every execution. Fairness guarantees that a infinite loop involving only one process will never be explored (i.e., all processes are guaranteed to eventually execute). This is critical for retransmission timeouts because the message sent from either one of the host processes could have been lost, and therefore that particular sender has to retransmit the packet. If the retransmission code from the other process is executed infinitely often, thus starving the sender, then the packet will never be transmitted and no progress will be made; the verifier will report a progress violation. SPIN, however, only has the notion of weak fairness -which means that fairness can only be enforced on operations that can always be executed. Our implementation of retransmission-that is, using SPIN's timeout boolean-does not meet this notion of weak fairness, as it can only be executed when there are no other actions to take in the system. Retransmission does not meet the requirements for weak fairness and therefore SPIN could not natively enforce fairness. Therefore, we had to explicitly force the model to execute retransmission timeouts fairly. Recall that each process in SPIN represents a single host, each of which may need to perform retransmission of packets to its peer. So, we enforced fairness among the timeout blocks of all host processes. This was done by creating a global queue of the host processes and then forcing the execution of timeouts to occur in the same order as the processes queue.
E. Completeness
In model checking, the gold standard for verification is if one's model reaches a fixed point. This means that all state transitions from the set of states that have already been explored lead to other states in this same set. In other words, state exploration is complete. Unfortunately, this model does not reach a fixed point due to version numbers. New migration events create new states because they have to increase the version number and thus new states can always be created. Thus, this model cannot validate all possible migration events over time. It has, however, been verified with up to five migrations. We could not get the model to verify for 6 migration events due to the increased memory requirements for the added state-space. It is believed that all subsequent migrations would be congruent to the first five, but this has not yet been proven.
F. Results
The verification of the protocol ran on a Sun SunFire X4100 server with two dual-core 2.2GHz Opteron 275 processors and 16GB of RAM. As expected, the runtime of the verification was highly dependent on the number of migration events that could occur. For 5 migration events, the progress property was verified in 14 minutes and 32 seconds and used 5297 MB of memory; the safety property verified in 3 minutes 18 seconds and used 3129 MB of memory.
The model verified the ECCP state machine, which we present in Figure 1 . An unexpected finding was the RSYN SENT RCVD state in the state machine. This state is necessary to ensure correctness when both hosts move before the migration protocol for either host fully completes. This state was only found thanks to a progress property violation in a previous version of the model.
VI. SECURITY
ECCP, like other connection-based network protocols, is potentially vulnerable to two main classes of malicious attacks: denial of service (DoS) and hijacking. A protocol is particularly vulnerable to a DoS attack if a request from an unverified party causes a host to spend a asymmetric amount of resources. The classic example of a DoS attack is SYN flooding, where cheaply crafted (and typically spoofed) SYN packets cause a server to allocate kernel memory buffers. Nothing in the ECCP protocol requires excessive memory or computation to process the initial handshake or the migration protocol. SYN cookies can also be used to prevent the allocation of kernel state to a new connection before return reachability is tested.
Protocol support for migration introduces new potential threats from attackers, who may try to (i) hijack ongoing connections by inserting control messages into the communication stream, or (ii) disrupt connections by sending fake migration messages. Fortunately, ECCP prevents such attacks from offpath entities by requiring the presence of nonces during migration. Nonces are 64-bit random values that are exchanged during flow setup; all subsequent control messages, including migration requests, must be accompanying by the appropriate nonce. Without on-path visibility into the control messages, off-path entities have no way of determining the correct nonce without resorting to online brute-force search. Brute-forcing this nonce by forging control packets is infeasible, as it will require an average of 2 63 messages to find a match. Migration protocols could also provide protection against on-path attackers. For example, TCP Migrate [17] resists onpath hijacking by using public-key cryptography to secure its control packets. On-path entities are still free to simply drop packets, of course. ECCP avoids such computationallyexpensive means and its non-cryptographic solution does not mitigate on-path hijacking, but in this regard, it is no less secure than existing protocols like TCP that do not support migration. Connections that require protection against on-path attackers should use (or are already using) higher-level mechanisms for securing the data stream, such as SSL. Securing the data stream is necessary for data integrity or confidentiality, while neither ECCP nor TCP Migrate protect against on-path attacks against availability.
VII. SIMULTANEOUS MOVEMENT
The ECCP protocol supports mobility whenever the two communicating hosts do not move at the exact same time. However, an in-band signaling protocol, without any additional mechanisms, cannot handle simultaneous changes in location. When two hosts undergo simultaneous movement, each host moves before it receives a message from its peer about that peer's new address. In this scenario, each host does not know the new address of its peer. Therefore, neither host can notify its peer of its new address and neither will receive a notification of its peer's new address.
We now discuss one mechanism that can enable the communicating hosts to recover their connection. It is possible to use a triangle-routing solution which uses globally-known, statically located, network-level elements (home-agents). In this solution, each host registers its location with its designated home-agent as it moves around the network as in Mobile IP [13] . During simultaneous movement, hosts can contact the home-agents of their correspondent hosts to learn their new locations. This solution is heavyweight in that it requires that most hosts on the Internet have static home agents with which they register their locations, which requires a lot of additional infrastructure and the purchase of home-agent services. This solution also undermines the location privacy of hosts by creating a central location which is aware of the full movement history of the host. This is an especially big concern for personal computing devices as we discussed in Section II.
We propose an alternate solution to allow connection recovery during simultaneous movement. In this solution, each network should have a local redirection middlebox, which keeps a short-lived redirection cache of the new locations of hosts that have recently moved out of its network. When a host moves, it should send its new address to the redirection middlebox of its old network to populate the redirection cache. Upon receiving a new cache entry, the redirection middlebox takes over (via gratuitous ARP-flooding or a similar mechanism) the old topological address of the moved host for the duration of the life of the cache entry. If the redirection middlebox gets an RSYN packet for an address in the cache, it simply forwards it to the new address of the host. All packets other than RSYN packets can be dropped by the redirection middlebox. The address of the redirection middlebox can be learned when a host joins a network (e.g., through DHCP).
The duration of time during which a redirection box must cache an entry can be short, measured in seconds, as it just needs to enable a single RSYN exchange between the two hosts and is not useful after a connection breaks because it exceeded its retransmission count and timeout. For this to be effective, only one of the communicating hosts needs to be part of a network with a redirection middlebox. This scheme is lightweight since the cache entries are short and decentralized. It also preserves privacy since a host needs to notify only the redirection box of the last network it visited of its new address rather than some central entity that knows the full history of its movements.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
The Internet architecture needs to evolve to offer better support for new technologies such as mobile devices and VM migration. Given that a complete overhaul of the Internet is not realistic, the ECCP protocol offers a way to incrementally evolve the Internet to support location dynamism and path multiplicity. We believe that this extension to the network stack is relatively easy to deploy and adds much needed functionality. It can also serve as a robust tool for future innovation that adds better support for multi-interface and multi-path communication in the transport layer.
A significant part of this paper was formal verification of the correctness properties of the ECCP protocol. This verification was not only useful in checking the correctness of the final protocol but also motivated the design by making us aware, early on, of the subtle edge-cases that we needed to consider for this class of protocols.
